The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious by Axel Cleeremans
Only but a few would be willing to grant any quantum of conscious 
experience to contemporary computers, yet they are undeniably 
capable of sophisticated information processing – from recogniz-
ing faces to analyzing speech, from winning chess tournaments to 
helping prove theorems. Thus, consciousness is not information 
processing; experience is an “extra ingredient” (Chalmers, 2007a) 
that comes over and beyond mere computation.
With this premise in mind – a premise that just restates Chalmers’ 
(1996) hard problem, that is, the question of why it is the case that 
information processing is accompanied by experience in humans 
and other higher animals, there are several ways in which one can 
think about the problem of consciousness.
One is to simply state, as per Dennett (e.g., Dennett, 1991, 2001) 
that there is nothing more to explain. Experience is just (a specific 
kind of) information processing in the brain; the contents of expe-
rience are just whatever representations have come to dominate 
processing at some point in time (“fame in the brain”); conscious-
ness is just a harmless illusion. From this perspective, it is easy to 
imagine that machines will be conscious when they have accrued 
sufficient complexity; the reason they are not conscious now is 
simply because they are not sophisticated enough: They lack the 
appropriate architecture perhaps, they lack sufficiently broad and 
diverse information-processing abilities, and so on. Regardless of 
what is missing, the basic point here is that there is no reason to 
assume that conscious experience is anything special. Instead, all 
that is required is one or several yet-to-be-identified functional 
mechanisms: Recurrence, perhaps (Lamme, 2003), stability of rep-
resentation (O’Brien and Opie, 1999), global availability (Baars, 
Consider the humble but proverbial thermostat. A thermostat is 
a simple device that can turn a furnace on or off depending on 
whether the current temperature exceeds a set threshold. Thus, 
the thermostat can appropriately be said to be sensitive to tem-
perature. But is there some sense in which the thermostat can be 
characterized as being aware of temperature? Contra Chalmers 
(1996), I will argue that there is no sense in which the thermostat 
can be characterized as being aware of temperature. There are 
two important points that I would like to emphasize in develop-
ing this argument. The first is that there is no sense in which the 
thermostat can be characterized as being aware of temperature 
because it does not know that it is sensitive to temperature. The 
second point is that there is no sense in which the thermostat can 
be characterized as being aware of temperature because it does not 
care about whether its environment is hot or cold. I will further 
argue that these two features – knowledge of one’s own internal 
states and the emotional value associated with such knowledge – 
are constitutive of conscious experience. Finally, I will argue that 
learning (or, more generally, plasticity) is necessary for both fea-
tures to emerge in cognitive systems. From this, it follows that 
consciousness is something that the brain learns to do through 
continuously operating mechanisms of neural plasticity. This I 
call the “Radical Plasticity Thesis.”
Information processing can undoubtedly take place without 
consciousness, as abundantly demonstrated not only by empirical 
evidence (the best example of which is probably blindsight), but 
also by the very fact that extremely powerful information-process-
ing machines, namely computers, have now become ubiquitous. 
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shared by monkeys (Humphrey, 1971). To a synesthete, perhaps 
seeing the color red will evoke the number 5. The point is that if 
conscious experience is what it feels like to be in a certain state, then 
“What it feels like” can only mean the specific set of associations 
that have been established by experience between the stimulus or 
the situation you now find yourself in, on the one hand, and your 
memories, on the other. This is what one means by saying that there 
is something it is like to be you in this state rather than nobody or 
somebody else: The set of memories evoked by the stimulus (or 
by actions you perform, etc.), and, crucially, the set of emotional 
states associated with each of these memories. This is essentially 
the perspective that Damasio (2010) defends.
Thus, a first point about the very notion of subjective experience 
I would like to make here is that it is difficult to see what experience 
could mean beyond (1) the emotional value associated with a state 
of affairs, and (2) the vast, complex, richly structured, experience-
dependent network of associations that the system has learned to 
associate with that state of affairs. “What it feels like” for me to see 
a patch of red at some point seems to be entirely exhausted by these 
two points. Granted, one could still imagine an agent that accesses 
specific memories, possibly associated with emotional value, upon 
seeing a patch of red and who fails to “experience” anything. But I 
surmise that this would be mere simulation: One could design such 
a zombie agent, but any real agent that is driven by self-developed 
motivation, and that cannot help but be influenced by his emotional 
states will undoubtedly have experiences much like ours.
Hence, there is nothing it is like for the camera to see the patch 
of red simply because it does not care: The stimulus is meaning-
less; the camera lacks even the most basic machinery that would 
make it possible to ascribe any interpretation to the patch of red; 
it is instead just a mere recording device for which nothing mat-
ters. There is nothing it is like to be that camera at that point in 
time simply because (1) the experience of different colors do not 
do anything to the camera; that is, colors are not associated with 
different emotional valences; and (2) the camera has no brain with 
which to register and process its own states. It is easy to imagine 
how this could be different. To hint at my forthcoming argument, a 
camera could, for instance, keep a record of the colors it is exposed 
to, and come to “like” some colors better than others. Over time, 
your camera would like different colors than mine, and it would also 
know that in some non-trivial sense. Appropriating one’s mental 
contents for oneself is the beginning of individuation, and hence 
the beginning of a self.
Thus a second point about experience that I perceive as crucially 
important is that it does not make any sense to speak of expe-
rience without an experiencer who experiences the experiences. 
Experience is, almost by definition (“what it feels like”), something 
that takes place not in any physical entity but rather only in special 
physical entities, namely cognitive agents. Chalmers’ (1996) ther-
mostat fails to be conscious because, despite the fact that it can 
find itself in different internal states, it lacks the ability to remove 
itself from the causal chain which it instantiates. In other words, 
it lacks knowledge that it can find itself in different states; it is but 
a mere mechanism that responds to inputs in certain ways. While 
there is indeed something to be experienced there (the different 
states the thermostat can find itself in), there is no one home to 
be the subject of these experiences – the thermostat simply lacks 
1988; Dehaene et al., 1998), integration and differentiation of infor-
mation (Tononi, 2003, 2007), or the involvement of higher-order 
representations (Rosenthal, 1997, 2006), to name just a few.
Another perspective is to consider that experience will never 
be amenable to a satisfactory functional explanation. Experience, 
according to some (e.g., Chalmers, 1996), is precisely what is left over 
once all functional aspects of consciousness have been explained. 
Notwithstanding the fact that so defined, experience is simply not 
something one can approach from a scientific point of view, this 
position recognizes that consciousness is a unique (a hard) problem 
in the Cognitive Neurosciences. But that is a different thing from 
saying that a reductive account is not possible. A non-reductive 
account, however, is exactly what Chalmers’ Naturalistic Dualism 
attempts to offer, by proposing that information, as a matter of 
ontology, has a dual aspect, – a physical aspect and a phenomenal 
aspect. “Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of 
information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical 
processing” (Chalmers, 2007b, p. 366). This position leads him to 
defend the possibility that experience is a fundamental aspect of 
reality. Thus, even thermostats, for instance, may be endowed with 
very simple experiences, in virtue of the fact that they can toggle 
in two different states.
What, however, do we mean when we speak of “subjective expe-
rience” or of “quale”? The simplest definition of these concepts 
(Nagel, 1974) goes right to the heart of the matter: “Experience” 
is what it feels like for a conscious organism to be that organism. 
There is something it is like for a bat to be a bat; there is nothing it 
is like for a stone to be a stone. As Chalmers (2007a) puts it: “When 
we see, for instance, we experience visual sensations: The felt quality 
of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth 
in a visual field” (p. 226).
Let us try to engage in some phenomenological analysis at this 
point to try to capture what it means for each of us to have an 
experience. Imagine you see a patch of red (Humphrey, 2006). You 
now have a red experience – something that a camera recording the 
same patch of red will most definitely not have. What is the differ-
ence between you and the camera? Tononi (2007), from whom I 
borrow this simple thought experiment, points out that one key 
difference is that when you see the patch of red, the state you find 
yourself in is but one among billions, whereas for a simple light-
sensitive device, it is perhaps one of only two possible states – thus 
the state conveys a lot more differentiated information for you than 
for a light-sensitive diode. A further difference is that you are able 
to integrate the information conveyed by many different inputs, 
whereas the chip on a camera can be thought of as a mere array of 
independent sensors among which there is no interaction.
Hoping not to sound presumptuous, it strikes me, however, that 
both Chalmers’ (somewhat paradoxically) and Tononi’s analyses 
miss fundamental facts about experience: Both analyze it as a rather 
abstract dimension or aspect of information, whereas experience – 
what it feels like – is anything but abstract. On the contrary, what we 
mean when we say that seeing a patch of red elicits an “experience” 
is that the seeing does something to us – in particular, we might feel 
one or several emotions, and we may associate the redness with 
memories of red. Perhaps seeing the patch of red makes you remem-
ber the color of the dress that your prom night date wore 20 years 
ago. Perhaps it evokes a vague anxiety, which we now know is also 
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As Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) insightfully pointed out, such 
representations are “first-order” representations to the extent that 
they are representations in the system rather than representations 
for the system that is, such representations are not accessible to the 
network as representations.
In other words, such a (first-order) network can never know that 
it knows: It simply lacks the appropriate machinery. This points 
to a fundamental difference between sensitivity and awareness. 
Sensitivity merely entails the ability to respond in specific ways 
to certain states of affairs. Sensitivity does not require conscious-
ness in any sense. A thermostat can appropriately be character-
ized as being sensitive to temperature, just as the carnivorous plant 
Dionaea Muscipula may appropriately be described as being sensi-
tive to movement on the surface of its leaves. But our intuitions (at 
least, my intuitions) tell us that such sensitive systems (thermostats, 
photodiodes, transistors, cameras, carnivorous plants) are not con-
scious. They do not have “elementary experiences,” they simply have 
no experiences whatsoever. Sensitivity can involve highly sophis-
ticated knowledge, and even learned knowledge, as illustrated by 
Hinton’s (1986) network, but such knowledge is always first-order 
knowledge, it is always knowledge that is necessarily embedded in 
the very same causal chain through which first-order processing 
occurs and that can therefore only be expressed through action as 
a direct result of perception.
Awareness, on the other hand, always seems to minimally entail 
the ability of knowing that one knows. This ability, after all, forms 
the basis for the verbal reports we take to be the most direct indica-
tion of awareness. And when we observe the absence of such ability 
to report on the knowledge involved in our decisions, we rightfully 
conclude that the decision was based on unconscious knowledge. 
Thus, it is when an agent exhibits knowledge of the fact that he 
is sensitive to some state of affairs that we take this agent to be a 
conscious agent. This second-order knowledge, I argue, critically 
depends on learned systems of meta representations, and forms the 
basis for conscious experience provided the agent also cares about 
certain states of affairs more than about others.
Consciousness thus not only requires ability to learn about the 
geography of one’s own representations, but it also requires that 
the resulting knowledge reflects the dispositions and preferences 
of the agent. This is an important point, for it would be easy to 
program a thermostat that is capable not only of acting based on 
the current temperature, but also to report on its own states. Such 
a talking thermostat would constantly report on the current tem-
perature and on its decisions. Would that make the thermostat 
conscious? Certainly not, for it is clear that the reporting is but a 
mere additional process tacked on the thermostat’s inherent ability 
to switch the furnace according to the temperature. What would go 
some way toward making the thermostat conscious is to set it up 
so that it cares about certain temperatures more than about others, 
and that these preferences emerge as a result of learning.
What would it take for a network like Hinton’s (1986) to be 
able to access its own representations, and what difference would 
that make with respect to consciousness? To answer the first ques-
tion, the required machinery is the machinery of agenthood; in a 
nutshell, the ability to do something not just with external states 
of affairs, but rather with one own’s representations of such exter-
nal states. This crucially requires that the agent be able to access, 
the appropriate machinery to do so. The required machinery, I 
surmise, minimally involves the ability to know that one finds itself 
in such or such a state.
This point can be illustrated by means of well-known results in 
the connectionist, or artificial neural network modeling literature. 
Consider for instance Hinton’s (1986) famous demonstration that 
neural networks trained through associative learning mechanisms 
can learn about abstract dimensions of the training set. Hinton’s 
(1986) network was a relatively simple back-propagation network 
trained to process linguistic expressions consisting of an agent, a 
relationship, and a patient, such as for instance “Maria is the wife 
of Roberto.” The stimulus material consisted of a series of such 
expressions, which together described some of the relationships 
that exist in the family trees of an Italian family and of an English 
family The network was required to produce the patient of each 
agent–relationship pair it was given as input. For instance, the net-
work should produce “Roberto” when presented with “Maria” and 
“wife.” Crucially, each person and each relationship were presented 
to the network by activating a single input unit. Hence there was 
no overlap whatsoever between the input representations of, say, 
Maria and Victoria. Yet, despite this complete absence of surface 
similarity between training exemplars, Hinton (1986) showed that 
after training, the network could, under certain conditions, develop 
internal representations that capture relevant abstract dimensions 
of the domain, such as nationality, sex, or age!
Hinton’s (1986) point was to demonstrate that such networks 
were capable of learning richly structured internal representations 
as a result of merely being required to process exemplars of the 
domain. Crucially, the structure of the internal representations 
learned by the network is determined by the manner in which dif-
ferent exemplars interact with each other, that is, by their functional 
similarity, rather than by their mere physical similarity expressed, 
for instance, in terms of how many features (input units) they 
share. Hinton (1986) thus provided a striking demonstration of this 
important and often misunderstood aspect of associative learning 
procedures by showing that under some circumstances, specific 
hidden units of the network had come to act as detectors for dimen-
sions of the material that had never been presented explicitly to the 
network. These results truly flesh out the notion that rich, abstract 
knowledge can simply emerge as a by-product of processing struc-
tured domains. It is interesting to note that the existence of such 
single-unit “detectors” has recently been shown to exist in human 
neocortex (Kreiman et al., 2002): Single-neuron recording of activ-
ity in hippocampus, for instance, has shown that some individual 
neurons exclusively respond to highly abstract entities, such as the 
words “Bill Clinton” and images of the American president.
Now, the point I want to make with this example is as fol-
lows: One could certainly describe the network as being sensitive 
to nationality, in the sense that it exhibits differential responding 
(hence, behavioral sensitivity) to inputs that involve Italian agents 
vs. English agents. But, obviously, the network does not know any-
thing about nationality. It does not even know that it has such and 
such representations of the inputs, nor does it know anything about 
its own, self-acquired sensitivity to the relevant dimensions. Instead, 
the rich, abstract, structured representations that the network has 
acquired over training forever remain embedded in a causal chain 
that begins with the input and ends with the network’s responses. 
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closely related to processes of learning, because one of the central 
consequences of successful adaptation is that conscious control is no 
longer required over the corresponding behavior. Indeed, it might 
seem particularly adaptive for complex organisms to be capable 
of behavior that does not require conscious control, for instance 
because behavior that does not require monitoring of any kind can 
be executed faster or more efficiently than behavior that does require 
such control. What about conscious experience? Congruently with 
our intuitions about the role of consciousness in learning, we often 
say of somebody who failed miserably at some challenging endeavor, 
such as completing a paper by the deadline, that the failure consti-
tutes “a learning experience.” What precisely do we mean by this? 
We mean that the person can now learn from her mistakes, that the 
experience of failure was sufficiently imbued with emotional value 
that it has registered in that person’s brain. The experience hurt, it 
made one realize what was at stake, it made us think about it, in 
other words, it made us consciously aware of what failed and why.
But this minimally requires what Kirsh (1991) has called “explicit 
representation,” namely the presence of representations that directly 
represent the relevant information. By “direct” here, I mean that 
the information is represented in such a manner that no further 
computation is required to gain access to it. For instance, a rep-
resentation that is explicit in this sense might simply consist of 
a population of neurons that fire whenever a specific condition 
holds: A particular stimulus is present on the screen, my body is 
in a particular state (i.e., pain, or hunger).
By assumption, however, such “explicit” representations are not 
necessarily conscious. Instead, they are merely good candidates 
to enter conscious awareness in virtue of features such as their 
stability, their strength, or their distinctiveness (Cleeremans, 1997; 
Cleeremans and Jiménez, 2002). What is missing, then? What is 
missing is that such representations be themselves the target of 
other representations. And how would this make any difference? 
It makes a crucial difference, for the relevant first-order representa-
tions are now part of the agent’s known repertoire of mental states; 
such representations are then, and only then, recognized by the 
agent as playing the function of representing some other (internal 
or external) state of affairs.
Necessary coNditioNs for awareNess
Let us now focus on the set of assumptions that together form 
the core of a framework that characterizes how learning shapes 
availability to consciousness (see Cleeremans and Jiménez, 2002; 
Cleeremans, 2008, for more detailed accounts). It is important to 
keep it in mind that the framework is based on the connectionist 
framework (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). It is therefore based 
on many central ideas that characterize the connectionist approach, 
such as the fact that information processing is graded and continu-
ous, and that it takes place over many interconnected modules con-
sisting of processing units. In such systems, long-term knowledge 
is embodied in the pattern of connectivity between the processing 
units of each module and between the modules themselves, while 
the transient patterns of activation over the units of each module 
capture the temporary results of information processing.
This being said, a first important assumption is that representa-
tions are graded, dynamic, active, and constantly causally efficacious 
(Cleeremans, 1994, 2008). Patterns of activation in neural networks 
inspect, and otherwise manipulate its own representations, and this 
in turn, I surmise, requires mechanisms that make it possible for an 
agent to redescribe its own representations to itself. The outcome of 
this continuous “representational redescription” (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992) process is that the agent ends up knowing something about 
the geography of its own internal states: It has, in effect, learned 
about its own representations. Minimally, this could be achieved 
rather simply, for instance by having another network take both the 
input (i.e., the external stimulus as represented proximally) to the 
first-order network and its internal representations of that stimulus 
as inputs themselves and do something with them.
One elementary thing the system consisting of the two intercon-
nected networks (the first-order, observed network and the second-
order, observing network) would now be able to do is to make 
decisions, for instance, about the extent to which an external input 
to the first-order network elicits a familiar pattern of activation over 
its hidden units or not. This would in turn enable the system to 
distinguish between hallucination and blindness (see Lau, 2008), 
or to come up with judgments about the performance of the first-
order network (Persaud et al., 2007; Dienes, 2008).
To address the second question (what difference would repre-
sentational redescription make in terms of consciousness), I appeal 
to Rosenthal’s (1997, 2006) higher-order thought (HOT) theory of 
consciousness. While I do not feel perfectly happy with all aspects of 
HOT Theory, I do believe, however, that higher-order representa-
tions (I will call them meta-representations in what follows) play 
a crucial role in consciousness.
An immediate objection to this idea is as follows: If there is noth-
ing intrinsic to the existence of a representation in a cognitive sys-
tem that makes this representation conscious, why should things be 
different for meta-representations? After all, meta-representations 
are representations also. Yes indeed, but with a crucial difference: 
Meta-representations inform the agent about its own internal states, 
making it possible for it to develop an understanding of its own 
workings. And this, I argue, forms the basis for the contents of 
conscious experience, provided of course – which cannot be the 
case in an contemporary artificial system – that the system has 
learned about its representations by itself, over its development, and 
provided that it cares about what happens to it, that is, provided 
its behavior is rooted in emotion–laden motivation (to survive, to 
mate, to find food, etc.).
the radical plasticity thesis
I would thus like to defend the following claim: Conscious experi-
ence occurs if and only if an information-processing system has 
learned about its own representations of the world in such a way that 
these representations have acquired value for it. To put this claim 
even more provocatively: Consciousness is the brain’s (emphatically 
non-conceptual) theory about itself, gained through experience 
interacting with the world, with other agents, and, crucially, with 
itself. I call this claim the “Radical Plasticity Thesis,” for its core is 
the notion that learning is what makes us conscious.
Before getting to the core of the argument, I should briefly 
sketch a framework through which to characterize the relation-
ships between learning and consciousness. If the main cognitive 
function of consciousness is to make adaptive control of behavior 
possible, as is commonly accepted, then consciousness is necessarily 
Cleeremans The radical plasticity thesis
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research  May 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 86 | 4
learning mechanisms, which instantiate the different computational 
objective of mastering specific input–output mappings (i.e., achiev-
ing specific goals) in the context of specific tasks through error-
correcting learning procedures.
Stability, strength, or distinctiveness can be achieved by different 
means. Over short time scales, they can result, for instance, from 
increased stimulus duration, from the simultaneous top-down and 
bottom-up activation involved in so-called “reentrant processing” 
(Lamme, 2006), from processes of “adaptive resonance” (Grossberg, 
1999), from processes of “integration and differentiation” (Edelman 
and Tononi, 2000), or from contact with the neural workspace, 
brought about by “dynamic mobilization” (Dehaene and Naccache, 
2001). It is important to realize that the ultimate effect of any of 
these putative mechanisms is to make the target representations 
stable, strong, and distinctive. These properties can further be envi-
sioned as involving graded or dichotomous dimensions (see also 
Maia and Cleeremans, 2005 for an exploration of how connectionist 
principles are relevant to the study of consciousness).
Over longer time scales, however, high-quality representations 
arise as a result of learning or cognitive development. Weak, fragile 
representations become progressively stronger and higher-quality. 
As a result, they exert more of an influence on behavior. In most 
cases, this is a good outcome because the stronger a representa-
tion is, the less it will require conscious control and monitoring. 
Thus, in any domain of experience (from being able to stand up 
to wine-tasting, from recognizing faces to reading) we begin with 
weak representations, which are characteristic of implicit cognition 
and do not require control because they only exert weak effects on 
behavior. Such representations, because of their poor quality, are 
also only weakly available to form the contents of consciousness. As 
learning progresses, the relevant representations become stronger, 
yet not so strong that they can be “trusted” to do their job properly. 
This is when cognitive control is most necessary. This is also the 
point where such explicit representations are most likely to form 
the contents of consciousness. Finally, with further training, the 
relevant representations become even stronger and eventually fully 
adapted. As such, these high-quality representations characteristic 
of automaticity no longer require cognitive control either, but this 
is so for completely different reasons than the weak representations 
characteristic of implicit cognition.
Thus, when I respond faster to a target stimulus in virtue of 
the fact that the target was preceded by a congruent subliminal 
prime, I can properly say that there exists a state c such that its 
existence made me respond faster, but by assumption I am not 
sensitive to the fact that this state c is different from state i where 
the target stimulus was preceded by an incongruent prime. States c 
and i are thus not conscious states – they merely exert their effects 
on behavior, so reflecting the agent’s sensitivity to their existence, 
but crucially not its awareness of their existence. The reason such 
states are not conscious states has to do with the properties of the 
corresponding first-order states: It is not so much that there is a 
failure of a higher-order system to target these states, but rather 
that the first-order states are too weak to be appropriate targets. 
You cannot know what is not (sufficiently) there.
Likewise, but perhaps more controversially so, habitual, auto-
matic behavior is often described as involving unconscious knowl-
edge: The behavior unfolds whether you intend to or not, it can 
and in the brain are typically distributed and can therefore vary 
on a number of dimensions, such as their stability in time, their 
strength. or their distinctiveness. Stability in time refers to how 
long a representation can be maintained active during processing. 
There are many indications that different neural systems involve 
representations that differ along this dimension. For instance, pre-
frontal cortex, which plays a central role in working memory, is 
widely assumed to involve circuits specialized in the formation of 
the enduring representations needed for the active maintenance 
of task-relevant information. Strength of representation simply 
refers to how many processing units are involved in the repre-
sentation, and to how strongly activated these units are. As a rule, 
strong activation patterns will exert more influence on ongoing 
processing than weak patterns. Finally, distinctiveness of repre-
sentation is inversely related to the extent of overlap that exists 
between representations of similar instances. Distinctiveness has 
been hypothesized as the main dimension through which cortical 
and hippocampal representations differ (McClelland et al., 1995; 
O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000), with the latter becoming active only 
when the specific conjunctions of features that they code for are 
active themselves.
In the following, I will collectively refer to these different 
dimensions as “quality of representation” (Farah, 1994). The most 
important notion that underpins these different dimensions is that 
representations, in contrast to the all-or-none propositional repre-
sentations typically used in classical theories, instead have a graded 
character that enables any particular representation to convey the 
extent to which what it refers to is indeed present.
Another important aspect of this characterization of represen-
tational systems in the brain is that, far from being static proposi-
tions waiting to be accessed by some process, representations instead 
continuously influence processing regardless of their quality. This 
assumption takes its roots in McClelland’s (1979) analysis of cascaded 
processing which, by showing how modules interacting with each 
other need not “wait” for other modules to have completed their 
processing before starting their own, demonstrated how stage-like 
performance could emerge out of such continuous, non-linear sys-
tems. Thus, even weak, poor-quality traces are capable of influencing 
processing, for instance through associative priming mechanisms, 
that is, in conjunction with other sources of stimulation. Strong, high-
quality traces, in contrast have generative capacity, in the sense that 
they can influence performance independently of the influence of 
other constraints, that is, whenever their preferred stimulus is present.
A second important assumption is that learning is a manda-
tory consequence of information processing. Indeed, every form of 
neural information-processing produces adaptive changes in the 
connectivity of the system, through mechanisms such as long-term 
potentiation (LTP) or long-term depression (LTD) in neural sys-
tems, or Hebbian learning in connectionist systems. An important 
aspect of these mechanisms is that they are mandatory in the sense 
that they take place whenever the sending and receiving units or 
processing modules are co-active. O’Reilly and Munakata (2000) 
have described Hebbian learning as instantiating what they call 
model learning. The fundamental computational objective of such 
unsupervised learning mechanisms is to enable the cognitive system 
to develop useful, informative models of the world by capturing 
its correlational structure. As such, they stand in contrast with task 
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(the flower is yellow), factivity (it is a fact and not just a possibil-
ity that the flower is yellow) and attitude (I know that the flower 
is yellow). Fully conscious knowledge is thus knowledge that is 
“attitude-explicit.”
This analysis suggests that a further important principle that 
differentiates between conscious and unconscious cognition is the 
extent to which a given representation endowed with the proper 
properties (stability, strength, distinctiveness) is itself the target of 
meta-representations.
Hence a second important computational principle through 
which to distinguish between conscious and unconscious repre-
sentations is the following:
Availability to consciousness depends on the extent to which a rep-
resentation is itself an object of representation for further systems of 
representation.
It is interesting to consider under which conditions a repre-
sentation will remain unconscious based on combining these two 
principles (Cleeremans, 2008). There are at least four possibilities. 
First, knowledge that is embedded in the connection weights within 
and between processing modules can never be directly available 
to conscious awareness and control. This is simply a consequence 
of the fact that consciousness, by assumption, necessarily involves 
representations (patterns of activation over processing units). The 
knowledge embedded in connection weights will, however, shape 
the representations that depend on it, and its effects will therefore 
detectable – but only indirectly, and only to the extent that these 
effects are sufficiently marked in the corresponding representations. 
This is equivalent to Dehaene and Changeux’s (2004) principle of 
“active firing.”
Second, to enter conscious awareness, a representation needs 
to be of sufficiently high-quality in terms of strength, stability in 
time, or distinctiveness. Weak representations are therefore poor 
candidates to enter conscious awareness. This, however, does not 
necessarily imply that they remain causally inert, for they can influ-
ence further processing in other modules, even if only weakly so. 
This forms the basis for a host of sub-threshold effects, including, 
in particular, subliminal priming.
Third, a representation can be strong enough to enter con-
scious awareness, but failed to be associated with relevant meta-
representations. There are thus many opportunities for a particular 
conscious content to remain, in a way, implicit, not because its 
representational vehicle does not have the appropriate properties, 
but because it fails to be integrated with other conscious contents.
Finally, a representation can be so strong that its influence can no 
longer be controlled – automaticity. In theses cases, it is debatable 
whether the knowledge should be taken as genuinely unconscious, 
because it can certainly become fully conscious as long as appro-
priate attention is directed to them (Tzelgov, 1997), but the point 
is that such very strong representations can trigger and support 
behavior without conscious intention and without the need for 
conscious monitoring of the unfolding behavior.
sufficieNt coNditioNs for awareNess?
Strong, stable, and distinctive representations are thus explicit 
representations, at least in the sense put forward by Koch (2004): 
They indicate what they stand for in such a manner that their 
unfold with attention engaged elsewhere, and so on. In such cases, 
behavior is driven by very high-quality representations that have 
become, through experience, optimally tuned to drive behavior. 
While such very high-quality representations are appropriate 
objects for redescription, the redescriptions either no longer play 
a functional role or are prevented from taking place (for instance 
because the agent’s attention is engaged elsewhere). Automatic 
behavior is thus not truly unconscious behavior (Tzelgov, 1997). 
Rather, it is behavior for which awareness has become optional. 
You can be perfectly aware of behavior that occurs automatically 
– you just seldom do so for it is neither necessary nor desirable for 
you to become aware of such behavior. That is precisely why the 
behavior has become automatic: Because it so adapted that it can 
unfold without the need for conscious monitoring.
Hence a first important computational principle through which 
to distinguish between conscious and unconscious representations 
is the following:
Availability to consciousness depends on quality of representation, 
where quality of representation is a graded dimension defined over 
stability in time, strength, and distinctiveness.
While being of high-quality thus appears to be a necessary condi-
tion for a representation’s availability to consciousness, one should 
ask, however, whether it is a sufficient condition. Cases such as hem-
ineglect or blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986) clearly suggest that quality 
of representation alone does not suffice, for even strong stimuli can 
fail to enter conscious awareness in such conditions. In normal 
participants, the attentional blink (Shapiro et al., 1997), as well as 
inattentional (Mack and Rock, 1998) and change blindness (Simons 
and Levin, 1997), are all suggestive that high-quality stimuli can 
simply fail to be experienced unless attended to. Likewise, merely 
achieving stable representations in an artificial neural network, for 
instance, will not make this network conscious in any sense – this 
is the problem pointed out by Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) 
about the limitations of what they called first-order networks: In 
such networks, even explicit knowledge (e.g., a stable pattern of 
activation over the hidden units of a standard back-propagation 
network that has come to function as a “face detector”) remains 
knowledge that is in the network as opposed to knowledge for the 
network. In other words, such networks might have learned to be 
informationally sensitive to some relevant information, but they 
never know that they possess such knowledge. Thus the knowledge 
can be deployed successfully through action, but only in the context 
of performing some particular task.
Hence it could be argued that it is a defining feature of con-
sciousness that when one is conscious of something, one is also, at 
least potentially so, conscious that one is conscious of being in that 
state. This is the gist of so-called HOT theories of consciousness 
(Rosenthal, 1997), according to which a mental state is conscious 
when the agent entertains, in an non-inferential manner, thoughts 
to the effect that it currently is in that mental state. Importantly, 
for Rosenthal, it is in virtue of occurrent HOTs that the target 
first-order representations become conscious. Dienes and Perner 
(1999) have developed this idea by analyzing the implicit-explicit 
distinction as reflecting a hierarchy of different manners in which 
the representation can be explicit. Thus, a representation can explic-
itly indicate a property (e.g., “yellow”), predication to an individual 
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knowledge (i.e., my knowledge of a typical dog) are less available 
to form the contents of conscious experience then are the highly 
distinctive representations characteristic of episodic memory.
Second, those representations that meet these minimal require-
ments for redescription need to be accessed by another, independ-
ent part of the system whose function it is to redescribe them. It 
is important to note here that mere redescription probably does 
not cut it, for even in a simple feedforward network, each layer can 
be thought of as being a redescription of the input. The brain is 
massively hierarchical and thus contains multiple such redescrip-
tions of any input. Instead of being strictly hierarchically organized, 
however, the redescriptions that count for the mechanism I have 
in mind should be removed from the causal chain responsible for 
the first-order processing. Hence, we need some mechanism that 
can access and redescribe first-order representations in a manner 
that is independent from the first-order causal chain.
I suggest that the general form of such mechanisms is some-
thing similar to what is depicted in Figure 1. Two independent 
networks (the first-order network and the second-order network) 
are connected to each other in such a way that the entire first-order 
network is input to the second-order network. Both networks are 
simple feedforward back-propagation networks. The first-order 
network consists of thee pools of units: a pool of input units, a 
pool of hidden units, and a pool of output units. Let us further 
imagine that this network is trained to perform a simple discrimi-
nation task, that is, to produce what is named Type I response in 
the language of Signal-Detection Theory. My claim is that there is 
nothing in the computational principles that characterize how this 
network performs its task that is intrinsically associated with aware-
ness. The network simply performs the task. While it will develop 
knowledge of the associations between its inputs and outputs over 
its hidden units, and while this knowledge may be in some cases 
very sophisticated, it will forever remain knowledge that is “in” 
the network as opposed to being knowledge “for” the network. In 
other words, such a (first-order) network can never know that it 
knows: It simply lacks the appropriate machinery to do so. Likewise, 
in Signal-Detection Theory, while Type 1 responses always reflect 
sensitivity to some state of affairs, this sensitivity may or may not 
be conscious sensitivity. That is, a participant may be successful in 
discriminating one stimulus from another, yet fail to be aware that 
he is able to do so and thus claim, if asked, that he is merely guess-
ing or responding randomly. In its more general form, as depicted 
in Figure 1, such an architecture would also be sufficient for the 
second-order network to also perform other judgments, such as 
distinguishing between an hallucination and a veridical percep-
tion, or developing knowledge about the overall geography of the 
internal representations developed by the first-order network (see 
also Nelson and Narens, 1990).
Can we use such architectures to account for relevant data? 
That is the question we set out to answer in recent work (e.g., 
Cleeremans et al., 2007; Pasquali et al., 2010) aimed at exploring the 
relationships between performance and awareness. We have found 
that different approaches to instantiating the general principles we 
have described so far are required to capture empirical findings. In 
one, as hinted at above, the first-order and the second-order net-
work are part of the same causal chain, but are trained on different 
tasks, one corresponding to first-order decisions and the second 
reference can be retrieved directly through processes involving low 
computational complexity (see also Kirsh, 1991, 2003). Conscious 
representations, in this sense, are explicit representations that have 
come to play, through processes of learning, adaptation, and evo-
lution, the functional role of denoting a particular content for a 
cognitive system. Importantly, quality of representation should be 
viewed as a graded dimension. This is essential to capture the fact 
that phenomenal experience, particularly ordinary phenomenal 
experience, appears graded itself. Gradedness can be achieved in 
different ways in a complex system such as the brain. One pos-
sibility is that representations are inherently graded because their 
vehicles are patterns of activation distributed over populations of 
firing neurons. Another is that representations tend to be all-or-
none, but always involve multiple levels of a hierarchy (Kouider 
et al., 2010).
Once a representation has accrued sufficient strength, stability, 
and distinctiveness, it may be the target of meta-representations: 
The system may then “realize,” if it is so capable, that is, if it is 
equipped with the mechanisms that are necessary to support self-
inspection, that it has learned a novel partition of the input; that 
it now possesses a new “detector” that only fires when a particular 
kind of stimulus, or a particular condition, is present. Humphrey 
(2006) emphasizes the same point when he states that “This self-
monitoring by the subject of his own response is the prototype of 
the “feeling sensation” as we humans know it” (p. 90). Importantly, 
my claim here is that such meta-representations are learned in 
just the same way as first-order representations, that is, by virtue 
of continuously operating learning mechanisms. Because meta-
representations are also representations, the same principles of 
stability, strength, and distinctiveness therefore apply. An impor-
tant implication of this observation is that activation of meta-
representations can become automatic, just as it is the case for 
first-order representations.
What might be the function of such meta-representations? One 
possibility is that their function is to indicate the mental attitude 
through which a first-order representation is held: Is this something 
I know, hope, fear, or regret? Possessing such metaknowledge about 
one’s knowledge has obvious adaptive advantages, not only with 
respect to the agent himself, but also because of the important role 
that communicating such mental attitudes to others plays in both 
competitive and cooperative social environments.
What is the mechanism through which such redescription is 
achieved? Minimally, enabling redescription of one’s own inter-
nal states requires such internal states to be available to redescrip-
tion, where availability is contingent, as described above, on such 
internal states being patterns of activation endowed with certain 
characteristics such as their strength, their stability in time, and 
their distinctiveness. Note that these assumptions rule out many 
potential sources of internal knowledge. For instance, the sort 
of weak, fleeting representations presumably resulting from the 
presentation of a brief stimulus would be poor candidates to be 
available to further processing. Likewise, the associative links that 
exist between representations, if implemented through patterns of 
connectivity between groups of units (as they are in connectionist 
networks) would likewise be inaccessible. Finally, and though this 
is more speculative (but see Brunel et al., 2010), it may also be the 
case that the highly distributed representations typical of semantic 
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required to place a high or a low wager on their decision, such 
as relative to stimulus identification for example. The intuition 
behind this measure is that people will place a high wager when 
they have conscious knowledge about the reasons for their deci-
sions, and a low wager when they are uncertain of their decisions. 
In this, wagering is thus similar to other subjective measures of 
awareness (Seth et al., 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010). According to 
Persaud et al. (2007) wagering provides an incentive for partici-
pants not to withhold any conscious information, as well as not 
to guess, making it a more objective measure of awareness than 
confidence judgment. Despite recent criticism of Persaud et al.’s 
claims (Dienes and Seth, 2010; Sandberg, et al., 2010), wager-
ing certainly reflects the extent to which an agent is sensitive to 
its own internal states. In Cleeremans et al. (2007), we therefore 
aimed at creating a wagering network, for wagering affords easy 
quantification and thus appeared more readily amenable to com-
putational simulation than other metacognitive measures such as 
confidence. In one of our simulations, which I will describe in more 
detail here, the first-order feedforward back-propagation network 
(see Figure 2) consisted of 7 input units representing digit shapes 
(as on a digital watch), 100 hidden units, and 10 output units 
for the 10 digits. The task of the first-order network is a simple 
one: It consists of identifying the “visual” representations of the 
digits 0–9. This is achieved by training the first-order network to 
respond to each input by activating one of its 10 output units. 
The 100 first-order hidden units connected to a different pool of 
100 hidden units of the second-order feedforward network, with 
2 output units representing a high and a low wager, as shown in 
Figure 2. The task of the higher-order network consisted of wager-
ing high if it “thought” that the first-order network was providing 
a correct answer (correct identification of the digit), and to wager 
low in case the first network gave a wrong answer (misidentifi-
cation of the digit). Note that as implemented here, there is no 
substantial difference between wagering and merely expressing 
confidence judgments.
 corresponding to metacognitive decisions. In a second approach, 
the two networks are truly independent. Note that in either case, 
our assumptions are oversimplified, for a complete implementation 
of the theory would require that the second-order network may 
influence processing as it takes place in the first-order network by 
means of recurrence.
In the following, I will illustrate the first approach, through 
which we have focused on architectures in which the first and 
second-order networks function as part of the same causal chain. 
Post-decision wagering was recently introduced by Persaud et al. 
(2007) as a measure of awareness through which participants are 
Figure 1 | general architecture of a metacognitive network. A first-order 
network, consisting for instance of a simple three-layers back-propagation 
network, has been trained to perform a simple classification task and thus 
contains knowledge that links inputs to outputs in such a way that the 
network can produce Type I responses. By design, this entire first-order 
network then constitutes the input to a second-order network, the task of 
which consists of redescribing the activity of the first-order network in some 
way. Here, the task that this second-order network is trained to perform is to 
issue Type II responses, that is, judgments about the extent to which the 
first-order network has performed its task correctly. One can think of the 
first-order network as instantiating cases where the brain learns about the 
world, and of the second-order network as instantiating cases where the brain 
learns about itself.
Figure 2 | Architecture of a wagering network. A first-order network 
instantiates a simple pattern classifier trained to classify “visual” input 
patterns representing the shapes of digits 0–9 in 10 categories. A second-
order network is assigned the task of wagering on the first-order network’s 
performance based on the latter’s internal representations of the stimulus. The 
second-order network thus performs judgments about the extent to which the 
first-order network is correct in its own decisions.
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performance of the second-order network begins to decrease. This 
corresponds to a stage where the second-order network is beginning 
to bet “high” on some occasions as it learns to categorize states of 
the first-order network that are predictive of a correct classifica-
tion. An interesting pattern of dissociation then occurs, for the 
second-order network is performing rather poorly just when the 
first-order network is beginning to truly master its own digit clas-
sification task. One can think of that stage as corresponding to a 
point in training where the system as a whole is essentially acting 
based on unconscious knowledge: First-order performance on the 
digit classification task is well above chance level, yet, wagering by 
the second-order network is close to chance, and is at chance on 
epoch 40. Later on, after epoch 40, the second-order network has 
learned enough about when the first-order network will be correct 
vs. incorrect to begin attempting to maximize its own wagering 
performance. Thus, epoch 40 corresponds to the second-order 
network’s “most doubtful moment.” One could view this as the 
moment at which the higher-order network abandons a simple 
“safe” strategy of low wagers and explores the space of first-order 
hidden unit representations, looking for a criterion that will allow 
it to separate good from bad identifications.
Thus, as the two networks learn simultaneously to perform their 
respective tasks, one sees the entire system shifting from a situation 
where there is no relationship between first- and second-order per-
formance to a situation where the two are correlated. This transition 
reflects, under our assumptions, a shift between unconscious vs. 
conscious processing.
In later work (Pasquali, et al., 2010), we have explored similar 
models based on germane or identical architectures and shown that 
they are capable of accounting for the data reported by Persaud et al. 
A learning rate of 0.15 and a momentum of 0.5 were used dur-
ing training of the first-order network. In a first condition of “high 
awareness,” the second network was trained with a learning rate of 
0.1, and in a second condition of “low awareness,” a learning rate of 
10−7 was applied. Ten networks were trained to perform their tasks 
concurrently throughout 200 epochs of training and their perform-
ance averaged. The performance of all three networks is depicted in 
Figure 3. Chance level for the first-order network is 10% (there is one 
chance of out 10 of correctly identifying one digit amongst 10); it is 
50% for the second-order network (one chance out of two of placing 
a correct bet). The figure shows that the first-order network simply 
gradually learns to improve its classification performance continu-
ously until it achieves 100% correct responses at the end of training. 
The performance of the “high awareness” second-order network, 
however, exhibits a completely different pattern. Indeed, one can 
see that the second-order network initially performs quite well, only 
to show decreasing performance up until about epoch 40, at which 
point its performance has sagged to chance level. From epoch 40 
onwards, the second-order network’s performance increases in par-
allel with that of the first-order network. This u-shaped performance 
pattern is replicated, to a lesser degree and with slightly different 
dynamics, in the “low awareness” second-order network.
One can understand this performance pattern as follows. Initially, 
the second-order network quickly learns that the first-order net-
work is systematically incorrect in classifying the digits. (which is 
expected since it has not begun to learn how to perform the task). 
The safest response (i.e., the response that minimizes error) is thus 
to always bet low. This, incidentally, is what any rational agent 
would do. However, as the first-order network quickly begins to 
exceed chance level performance on its digit classification task, the 
Figure 3 | Performance of the first-order and second-order networks, as a function of training expressed as number of epochs.
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both approaches by means of distinct architectures. Clearly, 
additional research is necessary to clarify the predictions of each 
approach and to further delineate their mechanisms.
Beyond giving a cognitive system the ability to learn about its 
own representations, there is another important function that 
meta-representations may play: They can also be used to anticipate 
the future occurrences of first-order representations (see Bar, 2009, 
on the human brain as a prediction machine). Thus for instance, 
if my brain learns that SMA is systematically active before M1, 
then it can use SMA representations to explicitly represent their 
consequences downstream, that is, M1 activation, and ultimately, 
action. If neurons in SMA systematically become active before an 
action is carried out, a metarepresentation can link the two and 
represent this fact explicitly in a manner that will be experienced 
as intention. That is: When neurons in the SMA become active, I 
experience the feeling of intention because my brain has learned, 
unconsciously, that such activity in SMA precedes action. It is this 
knowledge that gives qualitative character to experience, for, as a 
result of learning, each stimulus that I see, hear, feel, or smell is 
now not only represented, but also re-represented through inde-
pendent meta-representations that enrich and augment the origi-
nal representation(s) with knowledge about (1) how similar the 
manner in which the stimulus’ representation is with respect to 
that associated with other stimuli, (2) how similar the stimulus’ 
representation is now with respect to what it was before, (3) how 
consistent is a stimulus’ representation with what it typically is, (4) 
what other regions of my brain are active at the same time that the 
stimulus’ representation is, etc.
To see how this is different from mere first-order knowledge, 
consider what happens in the case of hallucination. Imagine a sim-
ple three-layers network akin to those described above in which a 
first layer of units receives perceptual input and is connected to a 
second layer of internal (“hidden”) units that are in turn connected 
to response units. One can easily train such a simple system to pro-
duce specific outputs in response to specific inputs (i.e., activating 
the “9” unit when presented with the visual pattern corresponding 
to the digit “9”). After training, each input will cause the emergence 
of a specific (learned) pattern of action over the network’s hidden 
units, and this will in turn cause a specific response. Crucially, one 
can now induce a specific response by either presenting a familiar 
pattern over the network’s input units (as it would be in the case of 
a genuine perception) or by directly activating the network’s hidden 
units with the learned pattern corresponding to that same input (as 
it could be, for instance, in the case of a memory retrieval whereby 
the pattern is reinstated by means of other pathways). The point is 
that the network would respond in exactly the same way in both 
cases for it simply lacks the ability to identify whether its response 
was caused by the activation of its input units or by the activation 
of its hidden units in the absence of any input. In other words, 
such a network is unable to distinguish between a veridical percep-
tion and an hallucination. Doing so would require the existence of 
another, independent network, whose task it is to learn to associate 
specific input patterns with specific patterns of activity of the first 
network’s hidden units. That system would then be able to identify 
cases where the latter exists in the absence of the former, and hence, 
to learn to distinguish between cases of veridical perception and 
cases of hallucination. Such internal monitoring is viewed here as 
(2007) in three different domains: Artificial Grammar Learning, 
Blindsight, and the Iowa Gambling Task. In all three cases, our simu-
lations replicate the patterns of performance observed in human 
participants with respect to the relationship between task perform-
ance and wagering. The blindsight and Artificial Grammar learning 
simulations instantiate the second approach briefly described above 
in that they use an architecture in which the processing carried out 
in second-order network is completely independent from that car-
ried out in the first-order network. In such architectures, the two 
networks are connected by means of fixed connections that instan-
tiate “comparator units.” The Iowa Gambling Task simulation, on 
the other hand, relies on the same mechanisms as described for the 
digits task. Interestingly, in this latter case, we were able to addition-
ally capture the fact that asking participants to reflect upon their 
own performance helps them improve metacognitive awareness 
(Maia and McClelland, 2004) and hence, the relationship between 
first-order performance and wagering. The fact that the relation-
ships between first-order and metacognitive performance can vary 
as a function of task instructions is borne out by a recent study of 
Fleming et al. (2010) which indicates large individual differences 
in people’s ability to judge their own performance. Strikingly, the 
authors found that differences in metacognitive ability were sub-
tended not only by differences in the activity of anterior prefrontal 
cortex, but also by structural differences in the white matter of 
these regions.
It may seem that the proposed mechanism is identical with sig-
nal-detection accounts of metacognition (e.g., Scott and Dienes, 
2008). However, there is a crucial difference. Signal-detection 
accounts typically make the second-order distinction between con-
fidence and guessing (high vs. low wagers) on the very signal that is 
used for first-order classifications by setting two boundaries on the 
signal: One boundary that accounts for the first-order classification, 
and a second boundary (on either side of the first-order bound-
ary) that distinguishes between guessing (cases that fall within the 
area defined by the second boundaries) and cases that fall outside 
of these boundaries (on the extremes of the distribution). In such 
an account, confidence thus depends directly on first-order signal 
strength (but see Maniscalco and Lau, 2010; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 
2010 for further discussion). However, in some of the models we 
have proposed, the second-order classification does not depend on 
the same signal as the first-order task. Indeed, instead of wagering 
high or low based on signal strength, the second-order network 
re-represents the first-order error as a new pattern of activation. 
Thus, before it can wager correctly, the second-order network, like 
the first-order network, has to learn to make a new, single-boundary 
classification based on this second-order representation (the error 
representation). Thus, the second-order network actually learns to 
judge the first-order network’s performance independently of the 
first-order task itself. The difference between our model and Signal-
Detection Theory is substantial, for it impinges on whether one 
considers Type I and Type II performance, that is, first-order and 
second-order judgments about these decisions entertain hierarchi-
cal or parallel relationships with each other. This issue is currently 
being debated, with some authors defending a dual-route model 
(Del Cul et al., 2009; Dehaene and Charles, 2010) and others (Lau, 
2010; Maniscalco and Lau, 2010) defending hierarchical models. 
The simulation work described in Pasquali et al. (2010) explored 
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